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PROTECTING PROTECTED SPEECH: 
VIOLENT VIDEO GAME LEGISLATION 
POST-BROWN v. ENTERTAINMENT 
MERCHANTS ASS’N 
Abstract: Violent video games have drawn the ire of parents and com-
mentators alike ever since their inception two decades ago. Following sev-
eral tragic school shootings in the late 1990s, legislators began exploring 
ways to limit childhood exposure to violent media. Since then, multiple 
states have tried their hand at regulating the sale of violent video games 
to minors. None of these attempts, however, survived the constitutional 
challenges levied against them in court by entertainment trade groups. 
Most recently, in 2011, the Supreme Court held that California’s attempt 
to legislate in this area was violative of the First Amendment. This Note 
argues that legislators should tread carefully in the wake of the Supreme 
Court’s unequivocal ruling. Rather than attempt to self-categorize what is 
or is not appropriate for children, they should instead mandate that video 
game developers and retailers participate in the ubiquitous Entertain-
ment Software Rating Board rating system. 
Introduction 
 Since their inception two decades ago, violent video games have 
caused quite a stir.1 Concern reached a fever pitch following an out-
break of youth violence manifested as a series of school shootings in the 
late 1990s.2 Partially blamed for the events, violent video games entered 
the realm of public discussion as parents clamored for a legislative solu-
tion.3 Psychological studies conducted around the same time seemed 
to support the view that these games lead to increased aggression in the 
                                                                                                                      
1See Jeffrey O’Holleran, Note, Blood Code: The History and Future of Video Game Censor-
ship, 8 J. Telecomm. & High Tech. L. 571, 580 (2010). Two of the first objectionably vio-
lent video games were Mortal Kombat, released in 1992, and Night Trap, released in 1993. 
Id. 
2See Patrick M. Garry, Defining Speech in an Entertainment Age: The Case of First Amendment 
Protection for Video Games, 57 SMU L. Rev. 139, 141 (2004). The atrocities committed at 
Columbine High School were just one example of several prominent school shootings that 
occurred between 1997 and 1998. See id. 
3 See Garry, supra note 2, at 141, 143–44; O’Holleran, supra note 1, at 584, 586. Video 
game censorship even became a talking point during the 2000 presidential elections. See 
O’Holleran, supra note 1, at 586. 
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children that played them.4 In the years since, several states have either 
passed or considered passing laws that restrict the sale of violent video 
games to minors.5 In every instance, organizations representing the 
video game industry have successfully challenged these laws in court.6 
In addition to discrediting the persuasiveness of the aforementioned 
studies, courts have repeatedly held these laws to be in violation of the 
First Amendment.7 
 The most recent attempt by a state to regulate the sale of violent 
video games occurred in California in 2005.8 Following the long line of 
cases preceding it, the Entertainment Merchants Association (EMA), 
an entertainment trade group, successfully won invalidation of a law 
that sought to restrict the sale of violent video games to children.9 Cali-
fornia appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 
where the law was similarly held to be in violation of the First Amend-
ment.10 Surprising both sides of the debate, the Supreme Court grant-
ed certiorari, marking the first time that the Court has heard a case 
considering the constitutionality of a violent video game law.11 In its 
landmark 2011 decision, the Supreme Court resoundingly struck down 
California’s attempt to regulate violent video game sales.12 
 This Note argues that current and future efforts to regulate violent 
video games should and will continue to fail constitutional scrutiny.13 
Legislators should instead focus on mandating that video game devel-
                                                                                                                      
4 See Jodi L. Whitaker & Brad J. Bushman, A Review of the Effects of Violent Video Games on 
Children and Adolescents, 66 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1033, 1036–38 (2009). 
5 See, e.g., Garry, supra note 2, at 143–44 (discussing ordinances in Indianapolis, Indi-
ana; St. Louis County, Missouri; and Seattle, Washington). 
6 See generally Interactive Digital Software Ass’n v. St. Louis Cnty., Mo., 329 F.3d 954 (8th 
Cir. 2003) (considering the constitutionality of a law prohibiting the sale of violent video 
games to minors); Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(concerning a violent video game ordinance enacted in Indianapolis, Indiana). 
7 See Entm’t Software Ass’n, Essential Facts About Video Games and Court 
Rulings 1, available at http://www.theesa.com/facts/pdfs/EFCourtsandRulings2010.pdf 
[hereinafter Essential]. 
8 See Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1746–1746.5 (West 2006); Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. 
Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 2009), aff’d sub nom. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. 
Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
9 See Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1048 (N.D. 
Cal. 2005) (granting a preliminary injunction against the State of California), aff’d, 556 
F.3d 950 (9th 2009), aff’d sub nom. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
10 See Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 967 (affirming the district court’s permanent injunc-
tion). 
11 See Schwarzenegger v. EMA, Media Coal., http://www.mediacoalition.org/VSDA-v.-
Schwarzenegger- (last visited Feb. 20, 2012) [hereinafter Media Coalition Synopsis]. 
12 Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2742. 
13 See, e.g., Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 967. 
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opers and retailers participate in the exceedingly successful Entertain-
ment Software Rating Board (ESRB) rating system.14 
 Part I of this Note introduces obscenity law and its progeny, vari-
able obscenity.15 Part II explores the difficulties inherent in regulating 
speech otherwise protected by the First Amendment, outlining both 
successful and failed efforts by state legislatures to shield children from 
explicit media.16 Part III describes the arguments used by proponents 
of violent video game regulation and introduces California’s recent at-
tempt to regulate the purchase of violent video games, Brown v. Enter-
tainment Merchants Ass’n.17 Finally, Part IV scrutinizes the studies and 
statistics that the proponents of regulation rely on and explains why the 
California statute at issue in Brown violated the First Amendment of the 
Constitution.18 It then articulates why Brown offers legislators the ideal 
opportunity to enact plausible reform that passes constitutional scru-
tiny.19 
I. The Supreme Court’s Treatment of Obscene Speech 
 This Part considers the history of obscenity jurisprudence, includ-
ing the Supreme Court’s creation of so-called “variable obscenity.”20 
Section A follows the Supreme Court’s decades-long process refining 
the definition of obscenity.21 Section B introduces the doctrine of vari-
able obscenity, which states that some material appropriate for adults 
may nevertheless be obscene to children.22 Section C exhibits how dif-
ficult it is to expand upon the type of material covered by obscenity 
law.23 Finally, Section D articulates the reservations Justice William 
Brennan developed with the very obscenity law he helped create.24 
                                                                                                                      
14 See Christopher Dean, Note, Returning the Pig to Its Pen: A Pragmatic Approach to Regu-
lating Minors’ Access to Violent Video Games, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 136, 161 (2006). 
15 See infra notes 20–85 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 86–140 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 141–196 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 197–221 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 222–280 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 25–85 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 25–51 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 52–65 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 66–77 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 78–85 and accompanying text. 
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A. Tracing the Shifting Definition of Obscenity 
 Legislators who have attempted to restrict a minor’s access to vio-
lent video games have argued that such material is obscene and thus 
devoid of First Amendment protection.25 Accordingly, in order to un-
derstand the legal underpinnings of violent video game laws, it is im-
portant to explore the line where free speech ends and obscene speech 
unprotected by the First Amendment begins.26 The First Amendment 
itself proclaims that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech . . . .”27 Despite the simplicity of the Free Speech 
Clause’s language, courts have continuously wrestled with its mean-
ing.28 
 In the landmark 1954 Supreme Court decision, Roth v. United 
States, the Court articulated the reason why, despite the unconditional 
language of the First Amendment, some forms of speech do not receive 
full constitutional protection.29 As Justice Brennan explained for the 
Court, at the time of the First Amendment’s ratification, every single 
state made blasphemy or profanity a statutory crime.30 In addition, at 
least one state made it a crime to publish some forms of obscene or 
profane materials.31 Accordingly, Brennan reasoned, the First Amend-
ment was never “intended to protect every utterance.”32 Over the 
course of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court carved out several 
exceptions to the First Amendment, including fighting words,33 ob-
scenity,34 defamation,35 and child pornography.36 
                                                                                                                      
 
25 See, e.g., Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 958. 
26 See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481–83 (1957). 
27 U.S. Const. amend I. 
28 See infra notes 29–51 and accompanying text. 
29 See 354 U.S. at 481–83. 
30 Id. at 482. 
31 Id. at 483. 
32 Id. “[T]his Court has always assumed that obscenity is not protected by the freedoms 
of speech and press.” Id. at 481. 
33 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). Fighting words refer to 
statements or phrases that incite a breach of the peace (such as fighting) by their very 
utterance. See id. The Supreme Court had afforded these words no First Amendment pro-
tection because of their limited social value relative to the improved order and morality 
gained by their censorship. Id. 
34 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973). Once again weighing the societal val-
ue of a particular form of speech, the Supreme Court has held that obscene material is 
unprotected by the First Amendment. See id. at 20. Aware of the dangers inherent in regu-
lating speech, the Court limited obscene material to works that depict or describe sexual 
conduct. See id. at 24. 
35 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339–40 (1974). Because of the damage 
that defamation can cause to an individual’s character, the Court has held that society is 
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 The unprotected utterance most often at question in video game 
violence litigation is that of obscenity—the very heart of Roth.37 Roth 
involved the mail-order sale of erotic books, photographs, and maga-
zines in violation of a federal obscenity statute criminalizing such be-
havior.38 Although the facts of Roth were rather innocuous, it gave the 
Court the opportunity to clarify and update the nearly century-old 
common law definition of obscenity.39 In doing so, the Court defined 
the test for obscenity as “whether to the average person, applying con-
temporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material 
taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.”40 In practice, this test 
required a jury to evaluate the materials in question and determine 
whether they would offend the conscience of the average member of 
their community by present-day standards.41 
 The Supreme Court narrowed the Roth obscenity test in the 1966 
case A Book Named “John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” v. At-
torney General of Massachusetts.42 In Memoirs, the Court formally adopted 
two additions to the Roth obscenity test that had originated in the lower 
courts.43 For material to be obscene under this new test, and thus un-
protected by the First Amendment, material must not only “appeal to a 
prurient interest,” but also be “patently offensive” and “utterly without 
redeeming social value.”44 In a practical sense, this new test narrowed 
the scope of obscenity by requiring proof that the material completely 
lacked social value—a huge challenge for the prosecution.45 For exam-
ple, in Memoirs, despite the fact that the book in question appealed to a 
prurient interest and was patently offensive, it could not be said that, 
                                                                                                                      
best served by limiting the First Amendment protection of defamatory speech. See id. at 
341. In addition, false statements of fact provide little value to society relative to the socie-
tal gain achieved by their restriction. See id. at 340. 
36 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982); Garry, supra note 2, at 152. 
37 See Roth, 354 U.S. at 479; Jennifer Chang, Note, Rated M for Mature: Violent Video Game 
Legislation and the Obscenity Standard, 24 St. John’s J. Legal Comment. 697, 702–03 (2010). 
38 Roth, 354 U.S. at 480. 
39 See id. at 488–89. 
40 Id. at 489. 
41 See id. at 490 (“In this case . . . you . . . are the exclusive judges of what the common 
conscience of the community is, and in determining that conscience you are to consider 
the community as a whole, young and old, educated and uneducated, the religious and the 
irreligious—men, women and children.”). 
42 See 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966); Roth, 354 U.S. at 489. 
43 See 383 U.S. at 418. 
44 Id. 
45 See id. at 419. 
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considering all possible uses, it lacked societal value as a piece of dra-
matic literature.46 
 This test proved unworkable, however, given the high degree of 
proof necessary to characterize materials as lacking any “redeeming 
social value.”47 In the 1973 Supreme Court case Miller v. California, the 
Court once again found itself evaluating standards of decency and 
sought to make the test for obscenity more concrete.48 In doing so, the 
Court rejected the difficult-to-overcome test of “utterly without redeem-
ing social value” as a constitutional standard, placing a new test in its 
stead.49 
 Thus, the test for obscenity became, and continues to be “(a) 
whether . . . the work . . . appeals to the prurient interest . . . ; (b) whe- 
ther the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual 
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) wheth-
er the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or 
scientific value.”50 This test gives greater deference to individual states 
in prescribing what materials are obscene.51 
B. Nevertheless Harmful to Children: The Birth of Variable Obscenity 
 Under the “variable obscenity” doctrine invoked by proponents of 
violent video game legislation, speech that does not meet the Miller test 
of obscenity may nevertheless be obscene to children; therefore, it may 
be without First Amendment protection.52 The types of games that leg-
islators have attempted to restrict minors from purchasing are not ob-
scene in the traditional sense: they neither depict sexual conduct nor 
lack serious artistic value and they are unquestionably legal in the 
hands of adults.53 Lawmakers contend, however, that despite their ac-
                                                                                                                      
46 See id. at 421. 
47 See Miller, 413 U.S. at 22. 
48 See id. 
49 See id. at 24. 
50 Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 
51 See id. By prefacing part (b) of the test on the applicability of state law, the Court 
made it clear that states are free to define what constitutes sexual conduct autonomously 
and in keeping with local values. See id. 
52 See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968). It should be noted that variable 
obscenity is merely a sub-category of obscenity and not a wholly new form of unprotected 
speech. See Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 959. 
53 See, e.g., Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d at 958. 
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ceptability for adults, these games are harmful and obscene to chil-
dren.54 
 Because the state has an interest in protecting the welfare of chil-
dren, the government is free to enact legislation that buoys parental 
supervision without violating First Amendment principles.55 The 1944 
Supreme Court decision Prince v. Massachusetts canonized this principle, 
as the Court described the need for “children [to] be both safeguarded 
from abuses and given opportunities for growth into free and inde-
pendent well-developed men and citizens.”56 Part of this protection, the 
Court explained, is provided through the prohibition of speech “wholly 
inappropriate for children . . . to face.”57 This child-centric principle 
reappeared several decades later as the Supreme Court grappled with 
shifting opinions over obscenity jurisprudence.58 
 In 1968, the Supreme Court decided Ginsberg v. New York, a land-
mark case that ushered in the “variable obscenity” doctrine.59 In Gins-
berg, a shop owner and his wife were prosecuted under a New York stat-
ute that made it illegal to sell so-called “girlie” magazines to children 
under the age of seventeen.60 These magazines, which contained nude 
photographs of women, were not obscene for adults; the legislation on-
ly prohibited minors from purchasing them.61 In fact, it was legal for 
parents to purchase these “girlie” magazines and then give them to 
their own children.62 Regardless, because the magazines were held to 
be obscene to children and thus unprotected by the First Amendment, 
the Court reasoned that the ability to keep such material out of the 
hands of children only required the state to show that it was rational to 
characterize such material as harmful to minors.63 The Court was not 
concerned with the lack of empirical studies depicting a causal link be-
tween viewing sexually explicit material and an impairment of child-
                                                                                                                      
54 See id. One state statute seeks to prevent the “psychological or neurological harm to 
minors who play violent video games.” Id. at 961. 
55 See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 640 (“[T]he State has an interest ‘to protect the welfare of 
children’ and to see that they are ‘safeguarded from abuses’ . . . .” (quoting Prince v. 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944))). 
56 See 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944). 
57 Id. at 170. 
58 See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 631. 
59 Id. at 638. 
60 Id. at 631. 
61 Id. at 634. 
62 Id. at 639. 
63 See id. at 641. This is an example of so-called “rational basis” judicial review. See id. 
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hood development.64 It was enough, the Court reasoned, that such a 
link had yet to be disproven.65 
C. Stevens Attempts (and Fails) to Expand the Scope of Obscene Speech Beyond 
Sexual Material 
 In the 2010 decision United States v. Stevens, the Supreme Court 
concluded that video depictions of violence towards animals did not 
constitute obscenity and steadfastly refused to create another categori-
cal exception to First Amendment protection to cover them.66 This case 
is illustrative of both the importance of the link between obscenity and 
sex and the difficulty inherent in creating a new category of unpro-
tected speech.67 
 Stevens considered the constitutionality of a federal statute that 
criminalized the sale of certain depictions of animal cruelty.68 The 
broadly worded statute applied to “any visual or auditory depiction ‘in 
which a living animal is intentionally maimed, mutilated, tortured, 
wounded, or killed,’” though it was primarily intended to outlaw so-
called “crush videos.”69 These videos, which depict the torture and kill-
ing of animals, were said to appeal to a deviant, prurient interest.70 Al-
though the statute was intended to outlaw crush videos, this was not 
clear in the broad language of the statute; thus, at the time of the stat-
ute’s enactment, the government announced that it would only pursue 
limited types of claims.71 Given the broad language of the statute in 
question, however, the Stevens Court grappled over the sale of videos 
depicting dogs hunting wild boars rather than the crush videos origi-
nally targeted.72 In fact, because of the aforementioned breadth of the 
statute, the Court never fully answered whether a more narrowly con-
                                                                                                                      
64 Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 641–42. 
65 Id. at 642. 
66 See 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1592 (2010). 
67 See id. 
68 Id. at 1582. 
69 Id. at 1583 (internal citations omitted) (“The acts depicted in crush videos are typi-
cally prohibited by the animal cruelty laws enacted by all 50 States and the District of Co-
lumbia. But crush videos rarely disclose the participants’ identities, inhibiting prosecution 
of the underlying conduct.”). 
70 See id. 
71 See Statement by President William J. Clinton upon Signing H.R. 1887, 34 Wkly. 
Comp. Pres. Doc. 2557, 2558–59 (1999). 
72 See 130 S. Ct. at 1583. 
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structed law would fall under the ambit of obscenity and therefore sur-
vive constitutional scrutiny.73 
 Since videos depicting hunting dogs are not sexual in nature, the 
Court could not simply uphold this law under the umbrella of obscen-
ity.74 Instead, the Court would have to create an entirely new category 
of speech (“depictions of animal cruelty”) unprotected by the First 
Amendment, something it was unwilling to do.75 Accordingly, once the 
Court determined that the vast majority of the speech covered by the 
statute was afforded First Amendment protection, it evaluated Stevens’s 
assertion that the law was facially invalid.76 Finding the scope of the 
statute to be “alarming” and impermissibly broad, the Court invalidated 
it as violative of the First Amendment.77 
D. Justice Brennan’s Criticisms of the Obscenity Test He Created 
 Given that speech characterized as obscene instantly loses its First 
Amendment protection, it is unsurprising that the government in Ste-
vens tried to leverage the ambiguous nature of obscenity in an attempt 
to uphold its challenged statute.78 This potential to stretch the bounda-
ries of obscene speech perhaps explains why Justice Brennan, the au-
thor of Roth in 1954, ultimately grew weary of what obscenity law had 
become and spent years working fervently toward a solution.79 His dis-
sent in the 1973 Supreme Court decision Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton 
identified what he considered the primary problems with obscenity law 
and eventually called to disband it entirely in order to prevent the ero-
sion of protected speech.80 His concerns included (1) the lack of a 
clear standard for what constituted obscene speech, (2) the chilling of 
protected speech, and (3) the institutional stresses placed on the judi-
ciary given the vagueness of their previous rulings.81 
 In Paris, Justice Brennan lamented the failure of the Supreme 
Court to create a workable method to distinguish protected speech from 
                                                                                                                      
73 Id. at 1592. 
74 See id. 
75 See id. 
76 See id. 
77 Id. at 1588, 1592. 
78 See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1592. 
79 See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 762 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting); 
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
80 See 413 U.S. at 83–91, 103 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
81 See id. at 91. Speech is chilled when a statute’s language is so vague or overbroad that 
it censors legitimate speech activities rather than just the inappropriate speech targeted. 
Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1191 (W.D. Wash. 2004). 
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unprotected speech.82 He blamed this shortcoming on the inability of 
the Justices to reach a consensus on any one standard.83 He later admit-
ted, however, that a single formula that achieves all of the intended 
goals of the Court does not exist.84 Famously, the Court determined 
that, when it comes to obscenity, they “know it when [they] see it.”85 
II. Overcoming the Hurdles Inherent in Legislating  
Protected Speech 
 This Part looks at the difficulties of regulating speech that falls 
outside the boundaries of obscenity and is otherwise protected by the 
First Amendment, including successes and failures by state legislatures 
to cull offensive forms of media.86 Section A introduces the strict scru-
tiny standard of judicial review employed for content-based restrictions 
of speech.87 Section B considers how enhanced accessibility permits 
upholding a statute that restricts media that is indecent but not ob-
scene in order to protect the healthy development of children.88 Fi-
nally, Section C contrasts the success of this indecent television restric-
tion with the failure of a violent video game statute, invalidated for the 
very same reason that the television statute was upheld—the healthy 
maturation of children.89 
A. Content-Based Restrictions (Generally) Require Strict Scrutiny Analysis 
 Regulations and statutes that attempt to restrict forms of protected 
speech based on its content presumptively violate the First Amendment 
and are thus subject to strict scrutiny analysis.90 A law is content based if, 
on its face, it differentiates between types of speech based on its content 
                                                                                                                      
82 See 413 U.S. at 83. 
83 See id. at 83–84. 
84 See id. at 84. 
85 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964). 
I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand 
to be embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never 
succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion 
picture involved in this case is not that. 
Id. 
86 See infra notes 90–140 and accompanying text. 
87 See infra notes 90–106 and accompanying text. 
88 See infra notes 107–115 and accompanying text. 
89 See infra notes 116–140 and accompanying text. 
90 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992); O’Holleran, supra note 1, at 
574. 
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or if its purpose is to suppress or laud one idea or viewpoint over an-
other.91 Because the freedom of speech promised by the First Amend-
ment is intended to remove the specter of the government from con-
trolling public discussion, laws that allow or disallow categories of 
speech based on their content presumptively violate that protection.92 
 For example, in the 2003 case Interactive Digital Software Ass’n v. St. 
Louis County, Missouri, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
held that an ordinance attempting to regulate “graphically violent” vid-
eo games was content based and thus presumptively invalid.93 Interactive 
involved the constitutional challenge of a local ordinance that made it 
unlawful to make graphically violent video games available to minors 
without their parents’ consent.94 Just because the ordinance was pre-
sumptively invalid, however, did not mean that it necessarily violated 
the First Amendment.95 It just means that courts will then review a con-
tent-based regulation of protected speech under “strict-scrutiny” analy-
sis, which is an admittedly difficult hill to climb.96 
 To survive this test, the legislature bears the burden of demonstrat-
ing that the act is “narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Govern-
ment interest.”97 Furthermore, “[i]f a less restrictive alternative would 
serve the Government’s purpose, the legislature must use that alterna-
tive.”98 In Interactive, St. Louis County failed to satisfy strict scrutiny be-
cause it could not prove that violent video games adversely affect the 
mental well-being of children, obviating any need for the government 
to regulate their sale.99 Furthermore, in light of existing and successful 
industry-led efforts to protect children from violent or otherwise ex-
plicit video games, it has thus far been impossible for states and mu-
nicipalities to uphold laws that restrict a minor’s access to violent video 
games.100 
                                                                                                                      
91 See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 
116 (1991); Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648–49 (1984) (“Regulations which permit 
the Government to discriminate on the basis of the content of the message cannot be tol-
erated under the First Amendment.”). 
92 Simon, 502 U.S. at 116. 
93 329 F.3d 954, 958 (8th Cir. 2003). 
94 Id. at 956. 
95 See id. at 958. 
96 See id. Strict scrutiny is the most rigorous level of judicial review applied by courts 
considering constitutional issues. See id. 
97 United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000). 
98 Id. 
99 Interactive, 329 F.3d at 960. 
100 See Guylyn Cummins, Sex, Violence, and Videogames, Comm. Law., July 2010, at 2, 3. 
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 In direct contrast to the difficulty of strict scrutiny analysis, courts 
considering regulations or statutes that aim to censor forms of unpro-
tected speech such as obscenity simply apply the rational basis form of 
judicial review.101 Rational basis review merely requires that the gov-
ernment action be “rationally related” to a “legitimate” government 
interest.102 Under the rational basis test, legislation will stand so long as 
a single conceivable rationale for its creation exists.103 In fact, the party 
seeking to remove the law carries the burden of negating every single 
basis put forth in support of the legislation in question.104 The rational 
basis test is such a low bar to clear that it can be argued that laws sub-
jected to it are presumptively valid, considering the amount of defer-
ence given to legislatures and the democratic process.105 Because of 
this, proponents of violent video game legislation have attempted to 
align violent material with sexually explicit material in order to take 
advantage of the less rigorous review applied to obscene content.106 
B. Successfully Restricting the Broadcast of Indecent Television 
 Despite acknowledging the constitutional protection afforded to 
speech that is indecent but not obscene, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the D.C. Circuit upheld a content-based restriction of broadcast televi-
sion programming in its 1995 decision in Action for Children’s Television v. 
FCC.107 The statute in question attempted to protect minors by restrict-
ing broadcasters to airing indecent programming between the hours of 
midnight and six in the morning.108 Although “indecent program-
ming” referred to material that was sexual in nature, it was not so objec-
tionable as to rise to the level of “obscenity” that would strip it of its 
First Amendment protection.109 The court justified its special treatment 
of broadcast programming by noting its unique accessibility to children 
compared to books and movies; this ultimately allowed the statute to 
survive the test of strict scrutiny.110 
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 The Action court relied on this enhanced accessibility when holding 
that “television broadcasts may properly be subject to different—and 
often more restrictive—regulation than is permissible for other media 
under the First Amendment.”111 Quoting an earlier Supreme Court rul-
ing, the Action court stated, 
A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the 
healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full matur-
ity as citizens. Accordingly, we have sustained legislation aimed 
at protecting the physical and emotional well-being of youth 
even when the laws have operated in the sensitive area of con-
stitutionally protected rights.112 
The court’s justifications for allowing the broadcast restriction to stand 
were similar to the rationales other courts have utilized when striking 
down comparable restrictions aimed at protecting minors from objec-
tionable media.113 As such, there seems to be a philosophical split 
across the lower federal courts as to whether exposing children to ob-
jectionable media helps or hinders their development into healthy, ma-
ture adults.114 Without the Action court’s presumption that preventing 
childhood exposure to objectionable media is a compelling govern-
ment interest, legislation of this kind would not survive constitutional 
scrutiny.115 
C. Efforts to Regulate Violent Video Games Have Thus Far Fallen Flat 
 Although a long history of Supreme Court jurisprudence has 
stripped obscene speech of First Amendment protection, the judiciary 
has yet to carve out a similar exception for violent material.116 Lower 
courts have been unwilling to analogize sexually explicit speech to vio-
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lent speech, perceiving the two as inherently different in the eyes of our 
society.117 For example, in addition to declaring violent video game 
regulations content-based restrictions in Interactive, the Eighth Circuit 
refused to liken violence to obscenity.118 Citing precedent extending 
full First Amendment protection to violent material found on televi-
sion, in film, and in literature, the court stated that “[s]imply put, de-
pictions of violence cannot fall within the legal definition of obscenity 
for either minors or adults.”119 
 The strongest support for the Interactive decision came from a 2001 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit case, American Amusement 
Machine Ass’n v. Kendrick.120 Much like Interactive, Kendrick dealt with a 
local ordinance restricting a minor’s access to violent video games.121 In 
Kendrick, the petitioners similarly attempted to analogize violence with 
sex, arguing that both were obscene and thus devoid of First Amend-
ment protection.122 Writing for the court, Judge Richard Posner felt 
otherwise, reiterating that violence and obscenity are distinct categories 
of speech.123 Obscenity, the court explained, generally refers to sexually 
explicit material.124 Violence, however, is not inherently sexual, nor is 
there any evidence that it appeals to a prurient interest such that it 
could pass the test for obscenity.125 
 Although the court acknowledged the similarities between obscen-
ity laws and those that attempt to restrict violence, it remained steadfast 
in keeping the two areas of speech distinct.126 Obscenity, the court 
elaborated, is undesirable not because of the ill effects it can have on 
individuals, but because it is impermissibly offensive to the community 
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at large.127 Therefore, while it is true that violent images can be offen-
sive, violent video game laws concern themselves with the alleged ef-
fects that the games can have on minors, not the level of offensiveness 
to the community.128 Given the widespread acceptance of violence in 
all facets of life and entertainment, it cannot be said that society is of-
fended by the violence found in video games.129 Accordingly, the court 
concluded, if society ceased to find obscenity offensive, statutory re-
strictions to its dissemination would be subject to the same level of scru-
tiny that other forms of protected speech receive.130 
 Society’s disparate treatment of violence was central to the court’s 
conclusion that violent speech should be analyzed differently than ob-
scene speech, which historically concerned sexually explicit material.131 
In making this point, the court referenced the violence found in classic 
works of literature such as the Odyssey, War and Peace, and Grimm’s fairy 
tales.132 Besides merely acknowledging historical examples of violence 
in cultural expression, the court went further, stating that “[p]eople are 
unlikely to become well-functioning, independent-minded adults and 
responsible citizens if they are raised in an intellectual bubble.”133 “To 
shield children right up to the age of 18 from exposure to violent de-
scriptions and images,” the court warned, “would not only be quixotic, 
but deforming; it would leave them unequipped to cope with the world 
as we know it.”134 
 The argument that exposing children to objectionable images is 
essential to their maturation differs greatly from the fears expressed in 
the 1968 Supreme Court decision, Ginsberg v. New York, which warned, 
in concordance with prevailing child-rearing standards, that sexually 
explicit material would be harmful to the development of children.135 
The courts in Kendrick, Ginsberg, and Action all placed the emotional 
well-being of children at the forefront of their decision making, but 
they disagreed over whether exposing children to explicit material 
helps or hinders their development into emotionally and morally 
healthy adults.136 Regardless, it seems clear that their judicial approach 
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differs only by a matter of degree—the tide could conceivably shift if 
the medium or the message were to change.137 
 The Seventh Circuit, for example, remains open to the idea that 
violence in video games could one day reach the level of cultural disap-
proval historically reserved for sexually explicit content.138 “If the 
games used actors and simulated real death and mutilation convinc-
ingly . . . , a more narrowly drawn ordinance might survive a constitu-
tional challenge.”139 Given the rapid evolution of video games and 
video game technology, that day may have already arrived.140 
III. The Current Landscape of Violent Video Game Law 
 This Part describes the present state of violent video game regula-
tion by evaluating current ratings and enforcement efforts and intro-
ducing the recent judicial proceedings in the Supreme Court.141 Sec-
tion A presents the independently regulated body responsible for 
rating video games based on their content, the ESRB.142 Then, Section 
B discusses the procedural history and importance of California’s failed 
attempt to regulate violent video games, Brown v. Entertainment Mer-
chants Ass’n.143 Finally, Section C summarizes the Supreme Court’s 
landmark 2011 decision in Brown.144 
A. Protecting Children: Today’s Entertainment Software Ratings Board 
 Parents of young children are not on their own when it comes to 
protecting their kids from unacceptably violent video games.145 Rather, 
they have the assistance of the ESRB, a non-profit, self-regulatory body 
that assigns content ratings to video games.146 Despite the voluntary na-
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ture of the program, the ESRB issued some 1638 ratings in 2010 alone, 
rating virtually every video game sold at retail in the United States.147 
 Even with the wide reach of the ESRB, a 2005 study reported that 
seventy percent of American children aged nine- to eighteen-years-old 
had played video games rated “M” (for mature players seventeen and 
older).148 Curiously, studies by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
and the ESRB reported that eighty-nine percent of parents are involved 
in the purchase of a video game for their child and, seventy-five percent 
of parents regularly check the rating of a video game before purchasing 
it.149 In addition, the most recent FTC mystery shopper study found 
that eighty percent of individuals under seventeen were turned away by 
retailers when attempting to purchase an M-rated video game.150 Taken 
together, these studies paint a curious picture of children playing 
games deemed inappropriate for their age purchased predominantly 
by their own parents.151 
 The voluntary nature of the ESRB ratings, however, allows children 
under seventeen to legally purchase explicitly rated video games from 
retailers without policies to the contrary.152 Commentators dissatisfied 
with the lack of legislation shielding children from violent video games 
point to psychological studies pronouncing the ill effects of exposing 
such materials to a young and impressionable audience.153 One promi-
nent psychologist who researches the effects of exposure to violent video 
games has concluded that exposure to violent video games increases 
physically aggressive behavior in some children.154 Other research has 
revealed other undesirable effects of exposing children to violent video 
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games, including increased aggressive thoughts, feelings, and physio-
logical arousal, and decreased so-called “prosocial behavior.”155 With 
these findings in hand, proponents of violent video game legislation 
have continuously sought to restrict the sale of such games to minors.156 
B. California’s Violent Video Game Law 
 One of the more recent and notable attempts to legislate against 
the sale of violent video games occurred in California and the debate 
over the law’s constitutionality has reached the halls of the Supreme 
Court.157 The story began on October 7, 2005 when California Gover-
nor Arnold Schwarzenegger signed into law a bill restricting the sale of 
“violent video games” to minors.158 Entertainment trade groups ad-
versely affected by the laws’ passage, most notably the Video Software 
Dealers Association (VSDA) (today known as the EMA), immediately 
expressed their opposition.159 
 In its appeal of the district court ruling permanently enjoining the 
enforcement of the law, California neither disputed that, broadly 
speaking, video games are a form of expression eligible for First 
Amendment protection, nor disagreed with the characterization of the 
law as “content based.”160 California, however, was not willing to con-
cede that its statute would be subject to strict scrutiny, the standard of 
review for all content-based restrictions.161 Rather, the State argued that 
their case was akin to the 1968 Supreme Court decision, Ginsberg v. New 
York.162 Ginsberg, which ushered in the notion of “variable obscenity,” 
permitted the continued enforcement of a statute that forbade minors 
from purchasing magazines considered obscene for minors yet unob-
jectionable for adults.163 California attempted to expand the variable 
obscenity doctrine to permit the prohibition of the sale of violent video 
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games to minors.164 The State reasoned that, if it successfully likened 
violent video games to sexually explicit magazines, then violent video 
games would lose their First Amendment protection as pertained to 
minors.165 If that were the case, instead of being subjected to strict scru-
tiny analysis, the law at issue in Schwarzenegger would be subject to the 
simpler to overcome rational basis test.166 Given the disparity between 
strict scrutiny and rational basis standards of judicial review, it was im-
perative that California avoid strict scrutiny if its violent video game law 
was to survive.167 
 The Ninth Circuit rejected California’s argument, however, point-
ing out that the Ginsberg Court was merely creating a sub-category of ob-
scenity rather than a brand new category of unprotected speech.168 Un-
like the violence at issue in Schwarzenegger, the objectionable content in 
Ginsberg was sexually explicit, thus hitting on the very essence of obscen-
ity jurisprudence.169 The Ninth Circuit noted that this link between sex 
and obscenity was the lynchpin of Ginsberg.170 “The Supreme Court,” the 
Ninth Circuit observed, “has carefully limited obscenity to sexual con-
tent” and furthermore, “has consistently addressed obscenity with refer-
ence to sex-based material.”171 
 Thus, the Ninth Circuit in Schwarzenegger ultimately declined to 
extend the “variable obscenity” classification to violent material, choos-
ing instead to apply strict scrutiny in analyzing California’s law.172 Un-
der this analysis, the court held that, despite the compelling interest 
shown in protecting the psychological well-being of children, the Cali-
fornia law failed the requirements necessary to restrict what is constitu-
tionally protected speech.173 Specifically, because the State did not 
demonstrate how existing video game labeling standards and parental 
controls failed to achieve the law’s desired purposes, it could not be 
said that the law employed the least restrictive means to achieve its 
goals.174 In addition, the State fell short in its attempt to show the req-
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uisite causal connection between violent video game-playing and chil-
dren’s psychological well-being.175 
 Schwarzenegger is hardly the first case of its kind,176 but it is notable 
for what happened after the Ninth Circuit’s decision.177 On April 26, 
2010, the Supreme Court granted California’s petition for certiorari, 
making Schwarzenegger, renamed Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, 
the first case concerning the restriction of video games that the Su-
preme Court has considered.178 Advocates on both sides, including the 
legislative sponsor of the bill in question voiced their surprise over the 
Court’s decision to hear the case.179 Given the copious precedent back-
ing Brown’s appellate decision, onlookers were equal parts perplexed 
and worried over whether this decision would upend decades of violent 
video game jurisprudence.180 
C. The Supreme Court Weighs In: Brown v. Entertainment  
Merchants Ass’n 
 Despite fears of commentators, on June 27, 2011, the Supreme 
Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s decision, finding California’s violent 
video game statute to be an impermissible violation of the First 
Amendment.181 The majority opinion, authored by Justice Antonin Scal-
ia, relied primarily on the notion that only a small, pre-defined subset of 
speech lacks First Amendment protection.182 These categories of speech 
(obscenity, incitement, fighting words, etc.) traditionally have found 
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disfavor in our culture and in our courts.183 Much like Judge Posner be-
fore him, Justice Scalia outlined how violence in media has no history of 
restriction in our society and steadfastly refused to add violence to the 
list of utterances unprotected by the First Amendment.184 
 Beyond this, Justice Scalia found California’s attempt to circum-
vent First Amendment protection by only directing the law at children 
to be unprecedented and unacceptable.185 He similarly dispensed with 
the notion that the interactivity of video games makes them unique as 
compared to other forms of media by noting the interactive nature of 
media as ancient as literature.186 Ultimately, Justice Scalia opined, the 
danger of California’s law is its apparent desire to restrict the ideas em-
bedded in violent media rather than the negative effects it may have on 
the viewer.187 Accordingly, after demonstrating why the First Amend-
ment protects violent media, Justice Scalia subjected California’s chal-
lenged legislation to strict scrutiny analysis.188 
 Strict scrutiny analysis requires that the law be justified by a com-
pelling government interest and be narrowly tailored to serve that in-
terest.189 Failing to find a compelling interest in shielding minors from 
violent video games, Justice Scalia illuminated the shortcomings of the 
research studies on which California heavily relied.190 These studies, 
rejected by every court that has considered them, simply failed to prove 
that there is a causal relationship between playing violent video games 
and an increase in aggressive behavior.191 As such, the Supreme Court 
could have found the law to be an unconstitutional violation of free 
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speech without even considering the second prong of strict scrutiny 
analysis.192 
 Undeterred, however, Justice Scalia noted that the success of the 
ESRB undermined any suggestion that the California law was the least 
restrictive way of keeping violent video games out of the hands of mi-
nors.193 Therefore, because California’s law failed both steps of the 
strict scrutiny analysis, the Court, like so many lower courts before it, 
rejected another attempt by a legislature to restrict a minor’s access to 
violent video games.194 Indeed, in his concurring opinion, Justice Sam-
uel Alito urged the Court to take caution when considering new forms 
of media, outlining the ways in which video games differ from older 
forms of entertainment.195 He envisioned a time in the near future 
when video games become so immersive that comparisons to books or 
radio would become foolish.196 
IV. Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n Signals the Need 
For Legislators to Abandon Similar Attempts to  
Regulate Violent Video Games 
 This Part explains why legislative attempts to restrict minors from 
purchasing violent video games have run afoul of the First Amendment 
and offers legislators plausible ways to assist parents in keeping such 
games out of the hands of children.197 Section A critically analyzes the 
studies and statistics proponents of violent video game legislation rely 
on to satisfy strict scrutiny analysis.198 Section B then explains why laws 
of this nature should and will continue to fail, including a discussion of 
why obscenity law is a poor vehicle for regulating the exercise of violent 
speech.199 Finally, Section C offers legislators a way to regulate the pur-
chase of violent video games effectively and constitutionally by requir-
ing that all retailers participate in and enforce the ESRB rating sys-
tem.200 
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A. Challenging the Claimed Adverse Effects of Exposing Children to  
Violent Video Games 
 Despite the continued reliance by proponents of violent video 
game legislation on particular psychological studies, courts have been 
reluctant to accept the results.201 In 2009’s Video Software Dealers Associa-
tion v. Schwarzenegger, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
flatly stated that the clinical evidence submitted by the defense did not 
support the inferences of psychological harm.202 The court questioned 
the validity of the presented findings, noting that the author seemingly 
abandoned attempts to identify differences in susceptibility of various 
age groups to violent video games because “there was a hint that the 
aggressive behaviour results might be slightly larger for the 18 and over 
group.”203 Because of such flaws, the research has failed to maintain 
credibility in several other violent video game legislation cases as 
well.204 Courts have routinely found research on the effects of violent 
video games on children either outright invalid or insufficient to estab-
lish the claimed causal link between aggression and violent video 
am
contention that video games provide benefits to the children that play 
                                                                                                                     
g es.205 
 The persuasive power of other clinical studies has been diminished 
in the eyes of courts due to the same underlying problem: insufficient 
evidence to support the claimed causal relationship between exposing 
minors to violent video games and increasing aggression.206 More 
broadly, Entertainment Software Association (ESA) research has con-
cluded that the totality of the scientific record on this matter does not 
establish a causal relationship between violent video games and violent 
behavior.207 In fact, one is just as likely to find empirical support for the 
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them.208 For example, a 2005 study found that video games allow chil-
dren to explore aggression in a safe setting, helping facilitate self-
control of physiological arousal.209 Another study from the same year 
found a strong correlation between playing video games and improved 
spatial abilities and reaction time.210 These studies and other data paint 
a very different picture of the impact of video game violence than pro-
ponents of violent video game legislation portray.211 
 Furthermore, if it were true that violent video games increase ag-
gression in the minors that play them, one would expect a steady uptick 
in youth violence correlating with the proliferation of violent video 
games.212 That has not been the case, however, as there has been a sev-
enty-five percent drop in the number of serious violent crimes commit-
ted by minors between twelve and seventeen years old between 1993 
and 2007.213 Although several factors have doubtless led to this de-
crease in the number of serious violent crimes committed by minors, it 
cannot be said that the presence of violent video games has been a cata-
lyst for societal harm.214 
 Additionally, of the 1638 ratings assigned by the ESRB in 2010, on-
ly five percent, or approximately eighty-two video games were rated “M 
(Mature).”215 In terms of sales, only seventeen percent of video games 
sold in 2009 were rated “M (Mature).”216 These small numbers, cou-
pled with the extremely telling mystery shopper figures collected by the 
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FTC—which found that eighty-seven percent of children under seven-
teen were turned away by retailers when attempting to purchase M-
rated video games—and the high level of awareness of the ESRB rating 
system among parents of children who play video games suggests that 
the current system is extremely effective at keeping violent video games 
out of the hands of minors.217 
 Some counter that the number of children under the age of eight-
een that have played an M-rated game is far too high to claim that the 
ESRB rating system is working effectively.218 The most plausible way to 
reconcile these conflicting arguments, however, is a bitter pill for critics 
of violent video games to swallow.219 Data confirms that parents are like-
ly purchasing M-rated games for their children.220 Because of this, 
there is little legislators can do, outside of completely banning the sale 
of violent video games, to keep them out of the hands of children.221 
                                                                                                                     
B. Why Violent Video Game Laws Should and Will Continue to Fail 
Constitutional Scrutiny 
 Given the intense scrutiny levied against the psychological studies 
proffered as evidence of the harmful effects that violent video games 
have on the children, there is little opportunity or incentive for judicial 
efforts to sanction regulation of the sale of violent video games to chil-
dren.222 Even in the absence of a sweeping declaration from the Su-
preme Court, States should resist the urge to replicate California’s ef-
forts for the reasons outlined below.223 
1. Violent Video Game Laws Will Continue to Fail Strict Scrutiny 
Analysis 
 Because the current ESRB-rating system is a less restrictive means 
of preventing children from directly purchasing violent video games, 
future attempts to legislate in this area will continue to fail strict scru-
tiny analysis.224 In order to survive strict scrutiny analysis of a content-
based restriction, States must demonstrate their compelling interest in 
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restricting a minor’s access to violent video games and prove that their 
method of so doing is narrowly tailored to accomplish that goal.225 Past 
efforts by States to regulate violent video games have failed both prongs 
of this test.226 
 In seeking to shield minors from violent video games, state laws 
have continually advanced two general interests: (1) preventing aggres-
sive behavior that may lead children to harm others, and (2) prevent-
ing undesirable neurological damage to the children exposed to vio-
lent video games.227 As previously explained, courts have been critical 
of States’ efforts to proffer evidence of these adverse effects.228 Most 
damningly, a 2005 Michigan District Court opinion found there to be 
an equivalent amount of data disproving a link between exposure to 
violent video games and an increase in aggression as there was support-
ing such a link.229 In a subsequent decision, the court also criticized the 
broad focus of the studies presented, many of which considered all 
forms of violent media rather than solely video games.230 Accordingly, 
without sufficient evidence of the dangers of exposing minors to violent 
video games, states will be unable to show that there is a compelling 
interest for restricting access to such games.231 
 Furthermore, even if States were successful in showing a causal 
connection between playing violent video games and increasing aggres-
sion, the current breed of state laws would still fail strict scrutiny analy-
sis.232 In addition to needing to further a compelling interest, state laws 
must be narrowly tailored to achieve their intended purpose.233 States 
have the burden of proving that there are no “less restrictive alterna-
tives [that] would be at least as effective in achieving the [State’s inter-
est].”234 Current efforts to regulate violent video games have ignored 
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the elephant in the room, the ESRB, to their detriment.235 In addition 
to the fact that the ESRB rates virtually every video game sold at retail 
in the United States, parents have an array of additional electronic pa-
rental controls at their disposal to help them decide which games are 
appropriate for their children.236 These mechanisms are already in 
place and have coalesced to achieve the very result that States seek 
through legislation.237 As such, it cannot be said that the burden of 
statutory intervention is less restrictive than methods already in 
place.238 Accordingly, because both the requisite elements will remain 
unsatisfied, laws regulating the sale of violent video games to minors 
will continue to fail strict scrutiny analysis.239 
2. Obscenity Law Is Fundamentally Flawed 
 Obscenity law suffers from several significant faults that render it a 
poor vehicle for video game legislation.240 Despite this, States seeking 
to restrict the sale of violent video games have begun to ask courts to 
liken violence to obscenity.241 Their goal in doing so is to create a First 
Amendment exception for violent speech aimed at minors similar to 
the variable obscenity exception.242 The comparison seems logical, but 
courts have resisted, adamant that the legal term “obscenity” refers only 
to sexually explicit materials.243 There may be, however, a more prag-
matic reason that courts have dodged requests to expand obscenity ju-
risprudence: obscenity law has devolved into an unwieldy, ad-hoc 
mess.244 
 As discussed previously, Justice William Brennan, author of Roth v. 
United States identified three issues plaguing obscenity jurisprudence: 
(1) the lack of clear standards defining obscenity, (2) the chilling effect 
on speech, and (3) the stress placed on the judiciary.245 Although he 
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was unable to overturn the rulings that shaped the obscenity law he 
grew to resent, Justice Brennan’s well-articulated fears served as a cau-
tionary tale to current and future justices.246 There is little doubt that 
the same problems would afflict the video game industry should efforts 
to treat violent speech as a category of obscenity succeed.247 
 The lack of a clear standard defining obscenity, the first of Justice 
Brennan’s worries, chills protected speech by failing to provide ade-
quate notice of what constitutes prohibited speech.248 The constant 
threat of legal punishment is significant enough that it deters the exer-
cise of speech that exists at the margins of legality, illuminating the ne-
cessity for narrowly tailored guidelines.249 As Justice Brennan noted, 
“First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive . . . .”250 If 
allowed to stand, violent video game laws, like that at issue in Schwar-
zenegger, would impermissibly scare retailers from selling all video games 
potentially in violation of the law to minors.251 
 Additionally, because of the difficulties in separating protected 
speech from unprotected speech, vague obscenity laws ultimately place 
a huge burden on the judicial system to sort out all of the cases at the 
margins.252 The fact-intensive nature of these cases, coupled with their 
sheer volume, creates an undesirable environment of unpredictabil-
ity.253 Violent video game laws would likely inundate the courts with 
challenges to the categorization of a game as lawful or unlawful under 
the First Amendment.254 Such a result would be absurdly inefficient, 
particularly given the effectiveness of the ESRB rating system.255 Ulti-
mately, obscenity jurisprudence is just a poor vehicle for regulating the 
sale of violent video games to minors.256 
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3. The High Cost of Litigation Is a Disservice to Taxpayers 
 That no State has been successful in asserting control over the sale 
of violent video games to minors should be a red flag to legislators, pre-
suming that their goal in enacting such legislation is truly to protect 
children rather than to garner votes for reelection by taking a tough 
stance against a sensationalized topic.257 The courtroom jousting be-
tween states and entertainment advocacy groups has led to a supreme 
waste of time and taxpayer dollars.258 
 For example, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
Illinois, in its 2005 decision in Entertainment Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich 
striking down a violent video game regulation as unconstitutional, 
awarded the video game industry $510,000 dollars for attorney’s fees 
alone.259 In total, $2,158,916 dollars of state and local taxpayer dollars 
have been paid directly to the entertainment industry for legal fees as-
sociated with litigating video game violence cases.260 And, these figures 
do not even factor in the salaries paid to and productivity lost by gov-
ernment employees involved in litigating what has repeatedly proven to 
be a losing cause.261 Accepting the unconstitutionality of violent video 
game legislation would greatly benefit the many States—not to mention 
taxpayers shouldering the burden—facing shrinking budgets and soar-
ing debt.262 
C. How to Regulate Violent Video Games Effectively and Constitutionally 
 Rather than try in vain to construct laws that prevent minors from 
purchasing violent video games, legislators should work in tandem with 
the video game industry to utilize and bolster the tools currently avail-
able to parents, such as ESRB rating.263 Indeed, just because current 
violent video game laws are unconstitutional and likely to fail in court 
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does not mean that a successful form of regulation will never emerge 
from the rubble.264 
 Legislators should first relinquish attempts to bracket violent video 
games with obscene speech in what has now proved to be a failed effort 
to leverage the so-called “variable obscenity” doctrine to their advan-
tage.265 The judiciary has been steadfast in its insistence that obscene 
speech refers only to sexual materials.266 Moreover, obscenity law has its 
own deficiencies that hamper its applicability.267 Further attempts to 
shoehorn regulation of violent video games into obscenity jurispru-
dence are likely to fail and consequently would drain taxpayer dollars.268 
 Secondly, proponents of violent video game regulation need to 
abandon flawed studies in favor of more credible research.269 Courts 
across the country and at all levels have been critical of the methodology 
and conclusions of many studies on the effects of violent video games; as 
a result, these flawed studies do little to legitimize the concerns of legis-
lators.270 That is not to say, however, that future efforts to prove a link 
between a minors’ exposure to violent video games and increased ag-
gression will suffer from the same deficiencies.271 Researchers must sim-
ply take the time to produce better, more persuasive studies.272 
 The best way to accomplish the goals of violent video game legisla-
tion would be to embrace and expand the current efforts of the 
ESRB.273 Although the ESRB is currently voluntary, virtually every game 
sold at retail is rated by the ESRB.274 Publishers whose games are rated 
by the ESRB are bound by industry-accepted advertising guidelines that 
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regulate the placement of ratings and restrict where M-rated games can 
be promoted.275 Additionally, the ESRB can already levy corrective ac-
tion against publishers that violate the disclosure requirements of the 
rating system, including refusing to rate a publisher’s future games.276 
 By making ESRB ratings a prerequisite to sale, legislators would 
guarantee that parents have all of the information necessary to make 
educated video game purchasing decisions.277 Enforcement of ESRB 
ratings in the retail environment would ensure that children are unable 
to purchase video games deemed inappropriate for their age without a 
parent.278 In sum, “the best rating system in the entertainment media” is 
already in place to achieve the very results desired by zealous legislators 
fearful of exposing minors to violent video games.279 By merely making 
what is already universally accepted mandatory, legislators can make 
sure that parents are the ultimate arbiters of the media their children 
consume.280 
Conclusion 
 Past efforts to legislate the sale of violent video games have proven 
costly and misguided. This is because obscenity law—and its progeny, 
variable-obscenity—are poor vehicles for the legislation regulation of 
violent video games. Courts across the country have resoundingly dis-
credited studies attempting to depict a causal link between exposing 
minors to violent video games and an increase in aggression. The focus, 
therefore, should shift to the lone bright spot that has emanated from 
the exaggerated fear over violent video games: the ESRB. The ESRB 
has a proven, successful method of screening and rating video games 
for explicit content, which educates parents that purchase these games. 
Accordingly, despite the fears of commentators that Brown could have 
undone years of violent video game jurisprudence, it instead rightfully 
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codified decades of case law, resulting in a clear mandate against simi-
lar restrictions of free speech. 
Christopher Clements 
